How does human nature shape human virtue? My research project addresses this question at the intersection of ancient proposals and current concerns in ethics.

In my doctoral dissertation, I show that Plato’s metaphysics in the Laws commits him to a particular account of virtue and political leadership. In the first chapter, I show that Plato’s metaphysical proposal characterizes human beings as partially dependent. This makes humans partly passive, weak, and inherently vulnerable to corruption. In the second chapter, I turn to the ethical implications of a dependent nature. According to the Laws, humans cannot attain perfect virtue; only divine beings can. This does not mean, however, that perfect virtue plays no part in organizing our lives. It serves as a “regulative ideal” for non-divine beings. In the third and last chapter, I argue that even the highest-standing officials in the city must make an ongoing effort to sustain non-perfect virtues. This explains why the city of the Laws depends on an intricate system of examination and testing of officials. According to my reading of the Laws, Plato makes several proposals we can appreciate; he embraces human imperfection, develops an early notion of non-ideal virtue, and argues for political accountability.

My current book project is entitled The Virtues of the People. Contemporary political philosophers argue that we need normative theories for non-ideal scenarios, understood as scenarios of severe injustice and oppression. Plato’s Laws envisages another reason for non-ideal theory: human beings are metaphysically dependent on the workings of the universe, and thus not apt to acquire perfect virtue. Nevertheless, we ought to strive to become better and we ought to aim for a social order that supports this. It is typically assumed that virtue ethics—because of its preoccupation with a perfect person—has nothing to say about non-ideal settings. Contrary to this assumption, I argue that Plato’s Laws is a rich resource for a non-ideal theory of virtue.